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I. INTRODUCTION
HIS article surveys and discusses selected significant employment
law cases decided in Texas during the Survey period from Novem-
ber 1, 2009 to September 30, 2010. Part II examines employment
arbitration cases in which employees argued unsuccessfully that their em-
ployment-related disputes with employers could be litigated in a judicial
forum and thus not subject to final and binding arbitration. Part III turns
to an interesting case involving unilateral employment contracts, at-will
employees, and an employer's alleged promise that those employees
would receive a percentage of proceeds from any future sale or merger of
the company. In Part IV, the article discusses the state sovereignty de-
fense as asserted in a case arising under the federal Family and Medical
Leave Act and regulatory regime. Part V considers a question regarding
admissibility of evidence concerning a worker's immigration status, and
the article then examines the preemptive scope of the state's employment
discrimination statute and the issue of court jurisdiction over
whistleblower claims in Parts VI and VII respectively.
II. ARBITRATION
In re Golden Peanut Co.1 presented a question whether wrongful death
* Alumnae Law Center Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. The
author acknowledges the research support provided by the Alumnae Law Center donors
and the University of Houston Law Foundation, and the research assistance of Kathy
Goodwin.
1. In re Golden Peanut Co., 298 S.W.3d 629 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam).
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beneficiaries were bound by an arbitration agreement between an em-
ployer and an employee killed in the course and scope of his employ-
ment. At the time of his death, the decedent Grant Drennan was party to
an agreement to arbitrate attached to his injury benefit plan with his em-
ployer.2 That agreement provided all claims or controversies relating to
Drennan's employment, including claims for personal injury and wrong-
ful death, were to be submitted to binding arbitration under the Federal
Arbitration Act.3 Responding to the beneficiaries' lawsuit and relying on
the arbitration agreement, the employer filed a motion to abate the law-
suit and compel arbitration, which the trial court denied. The Eastland
Court of Appeals then denied the employer's petition for mandamus re-
lief, concluding the trial court properly refused to order arbitration be-
cause the beneficiaries were not signatories to, and therefore were not
bound by, the arbitration agreement. 4
Noting that the court of appeals' decision was issued prior to the Texas
Supreme Court's decision in In re Labatt Food Services, L.P.,5 a unani-
mous supreme court reversed the court of appeal's holding that arbitra-
tion agreements are binding on wrongful death beneficiaries. "In Labatt,
we held that a decedent's pre-death arbitration agreement binds his or
her wrongful death beneficiaries because, under Texas law, the wrongful
death cause of action is entirely derivative of the decedent's rights."'6
Thus,
[i]f Drennan had sued for his own injuries immediately before his
death, he would have been bound to submit his claims to arbitration.
As derivative claimants under the wrongful death statute his benefi-
ciaries are bound as well . . . and the trial court clearly abused its
discretion by refusing to compel arbitration. 7
At issue in In re Odyssey Healthcare, Inc.8 was a trial court's refusal to
compel arbitration in a negligence action filed by an employee alleging
she was injured at work when she tripped on a step at a patient's home.
The employer, a non-subscriber hospice care provider, provided its work-
2. The employer "did not subscribe to worker's compensation insurance, but instead
provided employees with an Employee Injury Benefit Plan under the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act. Id. at 630.
3. See id.; Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1947).
4. See Golden Peanut Co., 269 S.W.3d at 314.
5. In re Labatt Food Servs., L.P., 279 S.W.3d 640 (Tex. 2009). For discussion of the
Labatt decision, see Ronald Turner, Employment Law, 63 SMU L. REV. 537, 540-41
(2010).
6. See Golden Peanut Co., 298 S.W.3d at 631.
7. Id. The beneficiaries also argued the arbitration agreement was an unlawful pre-
injury waiver of an employee's right to bring a cause of action provided by the Workers'
Compensation Act. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.033(e) (West 2005), amended by
2011 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 1108 (S.B. 1714). Rejecting that contention, the supreme
court reasoned that an arbitration agreement is not a waiver of a cause of action or other
rights provided in the workers' compensation statute; rather, the agreement merely pro-
vides that a claim is tried in an arbitral, as opposed to a judicial, forum. See Golden Peanut
Co., 298 S.W.3d at 631 (citing Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974) and
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
8. In re Odyssey Healthcare, Inc., 310 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. 2010) (per curiam).
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ers with an "Occupational Injury Benefit Plan" (that plaintiff-employee
was enrolled in) containing an agreement providing: "All claims or dis-
putes described below [including injury caused by negligence] that cannot
otherwise be resolved between the Company and you are subject to FI-
NAL AND BINDING arbitration. This binding arbitration is the only method
for resolving any such claim or dispute."9 The agreement also provided
that absent the parties' written agreement, an arbitrator would be se-
lected from a panel of arbitrators located in Dallas County, Texas. The
employer reserved the "right to amend, modify, or terminate the Plan at
any time" with the following proviso: "no such amendment or termina-
tion will alter the arbitration provisions incorporated into this booklet
with respect to, or reduce the amount of any benefit payable to or with
respect to you under the Plan in connection with, an Injury occurring
prior to the date of such amendment or termination."' 10 In addition, the
agreement provided that any amendment or termination of the arbitra-
tion provisions would not go into effect "until at least 14 days after writ-
ten notice has been provided to [an employee.]"' 1
A unanimous Texas Supreme Court considered and rejected several
arguments made by the employee supporting her position that the arbi-
tration agreement was not enforceable. First, the employee argued the
arbitration agreement was unconscionable because she worked in El
Paso, Texas and would be forced to arbitrate her case in Dallas. She
would thus incur substantial expenses in producing witnesses in that loca-
tion. Noting the employee bears the burden of proving the likelihood of
incurring such expenses, the supreme court concluded that the record
lacked information and evidence as to the costs the employee was likely
to incur.' 2 "Moreover, nothing in the agreement requires the arbitration
to occur in Dallas. The agreement simply provides that (absent agree-
ment otherwise) the arbitrator must be selected from a Dallas panel of
arbitrators. ' 13 And in the event the arbitration proceeded in Dallas at
substantial expense to the employee, the arbitrator may "assess whether
the cost provision in this case will hinder effective vindication of [the em-
ployee's] statutory rights and, if so, . . .modify the contract's terms
accordingly.' 14
Second, relying on Golden Peanut, the supreme court stated the em-
ployee erroneously contended that section 406.033(e) of the Texas Labor
Code voided the arbitration agreement.' 5 Third, the supreme court was
not persuaded by the employee's contention that the arbitration provi-
9. Id. at 421.
10. Id.
11. See id.
12. Id. at 422.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 423 (quoting In re Poly-America, L.P., 262 S.W.3d 337, 357 (Tex. 2008)); see
also Ronald Turner, Employment Law, 62 SMU L. REV. 1097, 1102-05 (2009) (discussing
Poly-America).
15. See Odyssey Healthcare, 310 S.W.3d at 423; TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.033(e)
(West 2005) amended by 2011 Tex. Sess. Law. Ch. 1108 (S.B. 1714); see also supra note 7.
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sion lacked consideration and was illusory for lack of mutual obligation.' 6
The lack of consideration argument was easily disposed of: "Mutual
promises to submit all employment decisions to arbitration is sufficient
consideration for such agreements."'1 7 The court concluded the agree-
ment was not illusory finding that: "an arbitration clause is not illusory
unless one party can avoid its promise to arbitrate by amending the provi-
sion or terminating it altogether.' 8 As the agreement provided that no
amendment or termination would be effective until at least fourteen days
after the employee had been given written notice, 19 "the arbitration
agreement did not contain an illusory promise by" the employer.20 Ac-
cordingly, the arbitration provision was valid and enforceable, and the
supreme court conditionally granted a writ of mandamus directing the
trial court to grant the employer's motion to compel arbitration.
But could an arbitration agreement signed by an employer and an at-
will employee be illusory? In In re 24R, Inc.,21 the Texas Supreme Court,
in yet another unanimous ruling, answered this question in the negative.
In an age and disability discrimination lawsuit brought by a terminated
employee, the plaintiff alleged that her employer fired her after she re-
quested certain workplace accommodations as directed by her physician.
Over the course of her fifteen years of employment with the company,
the plaintiff-employee, an at-will worker, signed three separate arbitra-
tion agreements that the company required all employees to sign as a
condition of ongoing employment. Pursuant to the employee policy man-
ual, the employer reserved "the right to revoke, change or supplement
guidelines at any time without notice, including the arbitration agree-
ment, and such agreement applied "to all types of claims and disputes
relating to employment and to termination of employment, .... "with an
arbitrator's decision final and binding on the parties.22 Seeking to compel
arbitration pursuant to the most recent agreement, the employer filed an
abatement and compulsory arbitration motion. The motion was denied
by the trial court and the court of appeals subsequently denied manda-
mus relief.23
Disagreeing with the lower courts' rulings, the Texas Supreme Court
noted at the outset that the plaintiff did not dispute that her discrimina-
tion claims were covered by and subject to the arbitration agreement; she
urged instead that the agreement was not enforceable because it lacked
16. Odyssey Healthcare, 310 S.W.3d at 424.
17. Id. (citing J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223, 228 (Tex. 2003)).
18. Id. (citing In re Halliburton Co., 80 S.W.3d 566, 570 (Tex. 2002)).
19. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
20. Odyssey Healthcare, 310 S.W.3d at 424; see also id. at 423-24 (concluding that the
Federal Arbitration Act did not violate the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
because compliance with the federal law would not directly impair Texas's ability to struc-
ture the state's integral operations in areas of traditional government functions).
21. In re 24R, Inc., 324 S.W.3d 564 (Tex. 2010) (per curiam).
22. Id. at 567.
23. See In re 24R, Inc., 324 S.W.3d 612 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2009), mand.
granted by 324 S.W.3d 564 (Tex. 2010).
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consideration and was rendered illusory by the employer retaining the
right to amend the agreement. Addressing whether the agreement was
enforceable (a question of law) and noting that mutual agreement to arbi-
trate provides sufficient consideration,24 the supreme court made clear
that "at-will employment does not preclude employers and employees
from forming subsequent contracts, 'so long as neither party relies on
continued employment as consideration for the contract." 25
Turning to the illusory promises argument, the supreme court treated
the employee manual and the arbitration agreement as separate and dis-
tinct documents. The manual (wherein the employer retained the right to
revoke or change terms without notice) "is not a contract" and "contains
an express disclaimer that '[tihe policies and procedures in this manual
are not intended to be contractual commitments by"' the employer.2 6 In
the arbitration agreement, which did not refer to or incorporate by refer-
ence the employee manual, the employer did not retain the right to
change or revoke its terms; indeed, the arbitration agreement expressly
provided that the "agreement to arbitrate ... continues beyond, and is
not affected by, a termination of employment. ' 27 As the "arbitration
agreement is a stand-alone contract that ... does not incorporate the
employee policy manual, ' 28 the arbitration agreement was not illusory
and the motion to compel should have been granted.
In another recent and interesting decision, by a divided Texas Supreme
Court, the majority opinion authored by Justice Nathan L. Hect 29 in East
Texas Salt Water Disposal Co. v. Werline,30 held that a district court order
denying confirmation of an arbitration award, which instead vacated the
award and directed a rehearing, was an appealable order. 31 Here, an em-
ployee and the company submitted to final and binding arbitration an
employee's claim that the company had breached a written employment
agreement and therefore owed the employee two years' salary as sever-
ance pay. The arbitrator found for the employee and awarded him the
24. See 24R, Inc., 324 S.W.3d at 566.
25. Id. at 566-67 (quoting J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223, 228 (Tex.
2003)).
26. Id. at 567. On the contract-negation function of express disclaimers in employee
handbook. See Fed. Express Corp. v. Dutschmann, 846 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. 1993) (per
curiam).
27. 24R, Inc., 324 S.W.3d at 568.
28. Id.
29. Id. Justice Hecht's opinion was joined by Justices Harriett O'Neill, Dale Wain-
wright, Phil Johnson, Don R. Willett, and Eva Guzman. Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson,
joined by Justices David Medina and Paul W. Green, dissented.
30. 307 S.W.3d 267 (Tex. 2010).
31. Id. at 274 (in so ruling, the supreme court disapproved Thrivent Fin. for Lutherans
v. Brock, 251 S.W.3d 621 (Tex. App.-Houston 2007), overruled by 307 S.W.3d 267 (Tex.
2010); Stolhandske v. Stern, 14 S.W.3d 810 (Tex. App.-Houston 2000), overruled by 307
S.W.3d 267 (Tex. 2010); and Prudential Sec., Inc. v. Vondergoltz, 14 S.W.3d 329 (Tex.
App.-Houston 2000), overruled by 307 S.W.3d 267 (Tex. 2010)).
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claimed pay.32 The company then petitioned the trial court to vacate,
modify, or correct the arbitration award, with the employee counter-
claiming for the award's confirmation. Finding the material, factual find-
ings in the arbitrator's award were "so against the evidence ... that they
manifest gross mistakes in fact and law," the trial court denied confirma-
tion, vacated the award, and ordered resubmission of the matter to a new
arbitrator who would decide one issue: whether the employment agree-
ment had been materially breached consistent with several findings made
in the trial court's judgment.33 Justice Hecht noted, "the do-over the
court ordered was to be one in which every material fact, and even the
result itself, were already conclusively established against" the em-
ployee.34 The employee appealed the trial court's ruling to the Texar-
kana Court of Appeals and the appellate court reversed the trial court's
judgment, confirming the arbitration award. 35
The company then asked the supreme court to reverse the judgment on
the ground that the appellate court did not have jurisdiction over the ap-
peal under section 171.098(a) of the Texas General Arbitration Act
(TAA).36 Concluding the trial court's judgment denying confirmation of
the award was appealable under TAA subsection (3) (section
171.098(a)(3)), 37 Justice Hecht addressed the company's argument that
TAA subsection (5) (section 171.098(a)(5)) 38 "implies (though it does not
state) that a court order vacating an award and directing a rehearing is
not appealable . . . ," thereby creating an exception to section
171.098(a)(3). 39 On that view, "an order denying confirmation and there-
fore appealable under subsection (3) is rendered not appealable by sub-
section (5) if it also vacates the award and directs a rehearing. '40
Justice Hecht was not persuaded. In his view, a judgment denying con-
firmation of an arbitration award "is not insulated from appellate review
... merely because the trial court also vacated the award and directed a
rehearing .... In denying [the employee's] request for confirmation of
the award, the district court made clear that it rejected the award and all
32. In addition to severance pay of $244,080, the arbitrator awarded the employee
attorneys' fees ($28,272), expenses ($11,116), and costs ($9,535). See E. Tex. Salt Water
Disposal Co., 307 S.W.3d at 268.
33. See id. at 269.
34. Id.
35. See Werline v. E. Tex. Salt Water Disposal Co., 209 S.W.3d 888 (Tex. App.-Texar-
kana 2006, pet. granted), affd, 307 S.W.3d 267 (Tex. 2010). As Justice Hecht noted, the
appeals court "held that it had jurisdiction to consider the appeal, that there was evidence
to support the award, and that '[t]he arbitrator did not err so egregiously as to imply bad
faith or a failure to exercise honest judgment."' E. Tex. Salt Water Disposal Co., 307
S.W.3d at 269-70 (footnotes omitted).
36. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE. ANN. §§ 171.001-.098 (West 2011).
37. "A party may appeal a judgment or decree entered under this chapter or an order
... confirming or denying confirmation of an award..." TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 171.098(a)(3) (West 2011).
38. Id. § 171.098(a)(5) (providing for appeal of judgment or decree, or an order "va-
cating an award without directing a rehearing").




bases on which it rested. '41 As for the company's argument that subsec-
tion (5) ("vacating an award without directing a rehearing") operates as
an exception to subsection (3) ("confirming or denying confirmation of
an award"), 42 Justice Hecht opined that section 171.098(a) "is a disjunc-
tive list of orders than can be appealed; it does not list orders that cannot
be appealed. '43 Thus, he concluded that an order denying confirmation,
including a denial in the form of a vacatur with rehearing, is appealable
under subsection (3), and a vacatur order without rehearing can be ap-
pealed under subsection (5).44 Furthermore, he continued stating that
section 171.098(a) limits a trial court's authority to review arbitration
awards. "Those limitations would be circumvented if re-arbitration could
be ordered for reasons that would not justify denying confirmation ....
And where, as here, the parties have agreed to 'final and binding' arbitra-
tion only for the Company to be given a Mulligan, their right to contract
is also subverted." 45
Finally, Justice Hecht referenced the following provision in the TAA:
the statute "shall be construed to effect its purpose and make uniform the
construction of other states' law applicable to an arbitration. '46 Survey-
ing the views expressed and positions taken in other states on the ques-
tion of whether an appeal is allowed in circumstances like those before
the supreme court, 47 he concluded that:
[T]he seventeen jurisdictions, other than Texas, that have consid-
ered whether to allow appeal in a situation like the one in this case
appear about evenly divided on the issue. As a result, to 'make uni-
form the construction of other states' law' on the subject before us,
as the TAA mandates, is beyond our power. We honor the statute's
spirit by making matters no worse than they already are.48
III. UNILATERAL EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS
Suppose that a company, seeking to incentivize at-will employees to
remain employed with the company, allegedly promised to pay five per-
cent of the value of any future sale or merger of the enterprise to workers
still employed at the time of such transaction; and when the company was
sold four years later, seven of the eight original employees still worked
for the company, but when those workers demanded the promised five
percent of the sale proceeds the company refused to pay. Is this promise
enforceable?
In Vanegas v. American Energy Services,49 a unanimous Texas Supreme
41. Id.
42. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
43. E. Tex. Salt Water Disposal Co., 307 S.W.3d at 271.
44. See id.
45. Id.
46. TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.003 (West 2011).
47. See E. Tex. Salt Water Disposal Co., 307 S.W.3d at 272-74 and cases listed therein.
48. Id. at 274.
49. Vanegas v. Am. Energy Servs., 302 S.W.3d 299 (Tex. 2009).
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Court held the aforementioned promise became an enforceable unilateral
contract when the employees gave valuable consideration by staying with
the company.50 Writing for the supreme court, Justice Paul W. Green
opined that even if the company's promise to at-will employees free to
quit their employment at any time was illusory when made, "what matters
is whether the promise became enforceable by the time of the breach.1
51
Explaining the difference between bilateral and unilateral contracts, 52 he
turned to what he called the "classic textbook example of a unilateral
contract: 'I will pay you $50 if you paint my house." 53 While that offer
can be withdrawn prior to performance, it cannot be withdrawn (and
therefore becomes binding) once an individual accepts the offer through
and by performance. 54 Assuming that American Energy Services did
make the offer to the employees, seven employees accepted that offer by
continuing to work for the company. At that point, the company's prom-
ise became binding and the agreement was breached when the company
refused to pay the workers their five percent share. 55
IV. STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
In University of Texas at El Paso v. Herrera,56 the Texas Supreme
Court addressed an important state sovereign immunity question arising
from application of a provision of the federal Family and Medical Leave
Act of 1993 (FMLA).57 The plaintiff, a heating and air-conditioning tech-
nician employed by the University of Texas at El Paso (UTEP), took a
nine-month leave after he injured his elbow while working. One month
after he returned to work, the plaintiff's employment was terminated and
he sued UTEP claiming (among other things) that he was fired for taking
a medical leave under the FMLA's "self-care" provision which provides
leave where "a serious health condition.., makes the employee unable
to perform the functions of the position of such employee. '58
The FMLA provides that eligible employees are entitled up to twelve
weeks of unpaid leave during any twelve-month period when an em-
ployee is not able to work because of a "serious health condition" or
other reasons permitted by the act. 59 Employees who return from FMLA
50. Id. at 304.
51. Id. at 303.
52. "A bilateral contract is one in which there are mutual promises between two par-
ties to the contract, each party being both a promisor and a promisee." Id. at 302 (quoting
Hutchings v. Slemons, 174 S.W.2d 487, 489 (Tex. 1943)). "A unilateral contract, on the
other hand, is 'created by the promisor promising a benefit if the promisee performs. The
contract becomes enforceable when the promisee performs."' Id. (quoting Piano Surgery
Ctr. v. New You Weight Mgmt. Ctr., 265 S.W.3d 496, 503 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no
pet.)).
53. Id. at 303.
54. See id.
55. Id.
56. Univ. of Tex. at El Paso v. Herrera, 322 S.W.3d 192 (Tex. 2010).
57. See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (2011).
58. See id. § 2612(a)(1)(D).
59. See id. § 2612(a)(1).
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leave are entitled to restoration to their former job or to an equivalent
position with equivalent pay, benefits, and other employment terms and
conditions. 60 In the case before the supreme court, it was undisputed that
the plaintiff was an eligible employee under the FMLA and that the
FMLA applied to UTEP and other state employers. What was at dispute
was whether the U.S. Congress had validly abrogated Texas's sovereign
immunity.61
In an opinion by Justice Don R. Willett, the supreme court held the
FMLA's self-care provision did not validly abrogate Texas's sovereign im-
munity. The supreme court noted that section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution 62 is the principal source
for abrogation of state immunity and legislation passed under that section
must satisfy the two-part test set out in City of Boerne v. Flores.63 With
regard to the first prong of that test (requiring a showing of an identified
constitutional injury by the states), the supreme court noted that in Ne-
vada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs64 the U.S. Supreme
Court held that Congress validly exercised its section 5 power when it
identified a pattern of gender discrimination by the states and enacted the
FMLA as statutory protection against workplace sex discrimination. 65
Hibbs, however, addressed the question of state sovereign immunity
under the FMLA's family-care provision which mandates leave to care
for a serious health condition of an employee's spouse, son, daughter, or
parent. 66 The plaintiff's case against UTEP was grounded in the self-
care, not the family-care, provision.67 For the supreme court this differ-
ence was critical: "There is simply no evidence-either in Congress's find-
ings or elsewhere in the FMLA's legislative record-that women took
more personal medical leave, or were thought to, than men."'68 The self-
care provision is not connected "to any pattern of sex-role stereotyping
by the States as employers. We agree with two States' highest courts, and
nine federal circuit courts, that Congress lacked the power to invoke its
60. See id. § 2614(a)(1).
61. The supreme court pointed out that the U.S. Congress can overcome state sover-
eign immunity by an unequivocal expression of congressional intent to do so, and by enact-
ment of sovereignty-abrogating federal laws enacted pursuant to a provision of the U.S.
Constitution. See Univ. of Tex. at El Paso, 322 S.W.3d at 195. As the text of the FMLA
explicitly provides, FMLA suits can be brought against the states, see 29 U.S.C.
§ 2617(a)(2), but the "second part is what matters here: did Congress have constitutional
authority to abrogate the States' immunity for purposes of the FMLA's self-care provi-
sion?" Univ. of Tex. at El Paso, 322 S.W.3d at 195 (footnote omitted).
62. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provi-
sions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
63. 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997). Section 5 legislation "must (1) counter identified consti-
tutional injuries by the States and (2) exhibit 'congruence and proportionality between the
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end."' Univ. of Tex. at
El Paso, 322 S.W.3d at 195 (footnote omitted).
64. See Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
65. Univ. of Tex. at El Paso, 322 S.W.3d at 196-97.
66. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C).
67. Univ. of Tex. at El Paso, 322 S.W.3d at 193.
68. Id. at 197.
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§ 5 abrogation power under the self-care provision. ' 69 Opining that "the
self-care provision was not intended to combat gender bias by the
States," the supreme court concluded that Congress exceeded its section
5 authority to abrogate the state's sovereign immunity under that FMLA
provision.70
The court's holding in Herrera-that the FMLA's self-care provision
invalidly abrogated the state's sovereign immunity-rejected the El Paso
Court of Appeals' determination that such provision was directed at two
related stereotypes: (1) "that a woman's job is secondary to her role in
the home" and (2) "that women of child-bearing age take more leave
than other employees. '71 Reasoning from this premise and baseline, and
from its understanding of the FLMA's legislative history and congres-
sional record, the court of appeals discerned a congressional intent
prophylactically addressing the realities and dynamics of gender discrimi-
nation concerns in the spheres of family care (as the Supreme Court rec-
ognized in Hibbs) and self-care. 72 That view was doomed to fail once the
supreme court concluded that state gender bias was not Congress's focus
in enacting the self-care provision and that the case before the court was
not governed by Hibbs, a conclusion buttressed by like decisions of the
Maryland and Utah Supreme Courts and nine federal circuit courts.73
Herrera is thus a defensible interpretation and construction of the
FMLA's self-care provision and an application of City of Boerne's two-
part test.
V. THE INADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OF A WORKER'S
UNDOCUMENTED STATUS
TXI Transportation Co. v. Hughes, a wrongful death and survival ac-
tion, addressed the question of whether admission of evidence concerning
the undocumented status of a company truck driver involved in an acci-
dent was harmless error.74 Seven family members were killed in a colli-
sion between their vehicle and an eighteen-wheel gravel truck driven by
defendant-company's employee. The survivors and the estates of the ve-
hicle occupants sued both the company and the truck driver. During
trial, and over the objections of the company, the jury heard evidence
that the truck driver was previously deported, and had misrepresented his
immigration status in obtaining a Texas commercial driver's license and
69. Id. at 198-200 (footnotes omitted).
70. Id. at 201. A state can also voluntarily waive its sovereign immunity and may
consent to suit. See id. at 195. The supreme court held that a sentence in UTEP's hand-
book of operating procedures-"An eligible employee may also bring a civil action against
an employer for violations [of the FMLA]"-did not constitute a voluntary waiver of
UTEP's immunity. Id. at 201. "This cursory language does not remotely constitute volun-
tary consent to suit, much less 'clear and unambiguous' consent." Id.
71. Univ. of Tex. at El Paso v. Herrera, 281 S.W.3d 575,582 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2008,
pet. granted), rev'd, 322 S.W.3d 192 (Tex. 2010).
72. Id. at 584.
73. See Univ. of Tex. at El Paso, 322 S.W.3d at 199-200 nn. 40-41 (listing cases).
74. TXI Transp. Co. v. Hughes, 306 S.W.3d 230, 233 (Tex. 2010).
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securing employment with the company. 75 Finding the defendants' negli-
gence was the proximate cause of the accident, the jury awarded compen-
satory and exemplary damages and judgment was entered by the trial
court.76 The Fort Worth Court of Appeals set aside the exemplary dam-
ages award but affirmed the judgment against both defendants.77
The Texas Supreme Court granted the employer's petition for review
and considered the parties' arguments for and against the trial court's
admission of evidence regarding the truck driver's unlawful immigrant
status.78 The plaintiffs argued that the driver's misrepresentations were
relevant to their claims of negligent hiring and negligent entrustment,
while the company argued this evidence was irrelevant to the issues
presented and was improperly used to inflame the jury and impeach the
truck driver's credibility.79
Agreeing with the company's position, Justice David Medina's opinion
for the supreme court opined that a plaintiff in a negligent hiring/negli-
gent entrustment case must prove the risk which caused the hiring or en-
trustment to be negligent proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries.80 In
a failure-to-screen case, the "plaintiff must show that anything found in a
background check 'would cause a reasonable employer to not hire' the
employee, or would be sufficient to put the employer 'on notice that hir-
ing [the employee] would create a risk of harm to the public."'81 If the
risk would not have been discovered by a background check, the plaintiff
asserting negligent hiring or negligent entrustment will not prevail. 82
Concluding the truck driver's immigration status was not the cause of the
collision, the supreme court determined that his status was not relevant to
the negligent hiring/negligent entrustment claims "even if [the com-
pany's] failure to screen, and thus its failure to discover [the driver's] in-
ability to work in the United States, 'furnished [the] condition' that made
the accident possible. '83
However, could the evidence of the driver's unlawful immigration sta-
tus be admissible for the purpose of impeaching his trial testimony? Dur-
ing trial, the driver testified that he had never lied to obtain a driver's
license and did not know whether he was legally authorized to work in
the United States.84 The trial court, applying Texas Rule of Evidence
75. See id. at 233-34.
76. Id.
77. See TXI Transp. Co. v. Hughes, 224 S.W.3d 870, 880 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007,
pet. granted), rev'd, 306 S.W.3d 230 (Tex. 2010).
78. In addition to the evidentiary issue discussed in the text, the supreme court held
that the testimony of the plaintiffs' accident reconstruction expert met the requisite stan-










801(e)(2)(A), 85 determined that the driver could be impeached by his
prior verbal statements because he was a party in the case and that his
statements as a party were not hearsay. 86 The supreme court did not
agree. "Whether impeachment evidence is hearsay... has nothing to do
with the relevancy requirement in Rules 401 and 402, or Rule 403's re-
quirement that evidence should be excluded if its prejudicial effect sub-
stantially outweighs any probative value. ' 87 That the driver's statements
were "not hearsay neither establishes their admissibility nor explains why
other witnesses were permitted to be questioned about [the driver's] im-
migration status, or why extrinsic evidence was admitted on the
subject." 88
But was the admission of the immigration-related evidence harmless
error? Cataloguing numerous references made during trial about the
truck driver's "illegal immigrant" status and previous deportation, the su-
preme court opined that the prejudicial potential of the immigration evi-
dence substantially outweighed its probative value.8 9 The repeated
statements and focus on the driver's unlawful immigration status clearly
concerned the justices. "Such appeals to racial and ethnic prejudices,
whether 'explicit or brazen' or 'veiled and subtle,' cannot be tolerated
because they undermine the very basis of our judicial process." 90 Cor-
rectly finding harmful error, the supreme court reasoned that the admit-
ted evidence "fostered the impression that ... [the] employer should be
held liable because it hired an illegal immigrant." 91 Accordingly, the su-
preme court reversed the court of appeals and remanded the case for a
new trial.92
VI. TEXAS COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
ACT PREEMPTION
In Waffle House, Inc. v. Williams, a significant case of first impression,
the Texas Supreme Court held an employee's common-law negligent su-
pervision and retention claims against her employer were preempted by
her sexual harassment claim brought under the Texas Commission on
Human Rights Act (TCHRA). 93 The plaintiff alleged she was sexually
harassed by a coworker, and sued Waffle House under the TCHRA and
also brought a common-law negligent supervision and retention action.
85. See Tex. R. Evid. 801(e)(2)(A).
86. TXI Transp. Co., 306 S.W.3d at 241.
87. Id.
88. Id.; see also id. at 241-42 (concluding that the driver's immigrant status was a col-
lateral matter and not relevant to proving a material issue in the case and that the immigra-
tion-related evidence was also inadmissible under Tex. R. of Evid. 608(b)).
89. Id. at 243.
90. Id. at 245 (quoting Tex. Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Guerrero, 800 S.W.2d 859, 864
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, writ denied)).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Waffle House, Inc. v. Williams, 313 S.W.3d 796, 798 (Tex. 2010); see TEX. LAB.
CODE ANN. § 21.0015 (West 2010).
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When the jury found for the plaintiff on both the negligence and TCHRA
claims, she elected to recover under the common-law cause of action.
The trial court entered, and the Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed, a
judgment of $425,000 in past and future compensatory damages and
$425,000 in punitive damages, interest, and costs. 94
Reversing the court of appeals, the supreme court expressed its opinion
"that the TCHRA, the [l]egislature's specific and tailored anti-harass-
ment remedy, is preemptive when the complained-of negligence is en-
twined with the complained-of harassment. '95 While the statute "does
not foreclose an assault-based negligence claim arising from independent
facts unrelated to sexual harassment," the supreme court believed that
the "[legislature's comprehensive remedial scheme" did not permit "ag-
grieved employees to proceed on dual tracks-one statutory and one
common-law, with inconsistent procedures, standards, elements, de-
fenses, and remedies."' 96 Thus, the supreme court concluded that the
TCHRA's statutory harassment claim was the plaintiff's exclusive rem-
edy against Waffle House.97
The supreme court opined that the plaintiff's recovery in her negli-
gence claim collided with the TCHRA's regulatory scheme 98 and ex-
ceeded the maximum $300,000 of combined compensatory and punitive
damages available under the TCHRA. 99 "If [the plaintiff's] common-law
claim for negligent supervision and retention is allowed to coexist with
the statutory claim, the panoply of special rules applicable to TCHRA
claims could be circumvented in any case where the alleged sexual harass-
ment included even the slightest physical contact." 00 Concerned that a
negligence claim "transmutes TCHRA-covered harassment into a com-
mon-law tort,"'' the supreme court concluded that the plaintiff's tort
claim "must yield to the [1legislature's statutory framework for sexual-
harassment claims. [The plaintiff's] remedy, if any, lies there. '10 2
Justice Harriet O'Neill, joined by Justice Medina, dissented. 10 3 Agree-
ing with the majority "that the TCHRA is preemptive as to behavior that
constitutes sexual harassment," she reasoned that:
[I]t does not follow that a victim of assault should be denied com-
mon law redress for injury the assault caused when the perpetrator
sexually harasses her as well. While an employer is not an insurer of
94. See Waffle House, 313 S.W.3d at 799-801.
95. Id. at 799.
96. Id.
97. See id. at 802.
98. See id. at 804.
99. See id. at 807. Under the TCHRA the combined sum of compensatory and puni-
tive damages awarded against an employer with more than 500 employees (like Waffle
House) is capped at $300,000. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.2585(d) (West 2010). The
plaintiff's judgment for $850,000 far exceeded the TCHRA maximum. Waffle House, 313
S.W.3d at 807.
100. Waffle House, 313 S.W.3d at 807.
101. Id. at 811.
102. Id. at 812.
103. Id. at 813 (O'Neill, J., dissenting).
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its employees' safety at work, the common law clearly imposes a duty
on employers to provide a safe work place. 10 4
Justice O'Neill posited that the majority's construct would have the fol-
lowing effect in these scenarios: (1) Where "Employee A repeatedly
slams Employee B into the wall" and the employer takes no reasonable
action in response to that conduct "Employee B may sue for assault-
based negligent supervision." 10 5 (2) Where "Employee A gropes Em-
ployee B before repeatedly slamming her into the wall" and no reasona-
ble responsive action is taken by the employer "[t]he TCHRA is
Employee B's exclusive remedy. ' 10 6 The employer's liability for assault-
ive conduct in scenario 1 would be greater than the assaultive and sexu-
ally abusive misconduct in scenario 2. "Surely in its statutory attempt to
afford greater workplace protection from sexual harassment the
[1legislature did not intend to curtail relief for victims of assault. '107
Justice O'Neill's dissent makes the interesting (and in the author's
view) persuasive point that a consequence of the supreme court's analysis
and holding is that a claim of employer negligence unaccompanied by
sexually harassing conduct can be the subject of a tort suit with exposure
to compensatory and punitive damages award, while the same negligence
claim accompanied by alleged sexual harassment is preempted by the
TCHRA and is subject to that statute's capped damages. Viewed from
the plaintiff-employee's perspective, more alleged misconduct (a case
presenting negligence and harassment claims) can lead to less in regards
to potential recovery of damages. Conversely, and from the defendant-
employer's perspective, the harassment allegation eliminates the com-
mon-law track and relegates the claimant to the TCHRA's maximum-
damages rule. Thus, unlike sexual-harassment plaintiffs suing employers
in federal court under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964108 who can
and do bring pendant state-law tort claims, 10 9 and plaintiffs in other states
who may pursue both state statutory antidiscrimination law and common
law tort claims, 110 in Texas, Waffle House restricts such plaintiffs to one
and only one exclusive remedy-the TCHRA.
104. Id. at 814-15.
105. Id. at 815.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (2011).
109. See, e.g., Dulaney v. Packaging Corp. of Am., No. 7:09-CV-00063, 2010 WL
4736615 (W.D. Va. Nov. 15, 2010) (plaintiff brought action for sexual harassment under
Title VII and Virginia common law claims for assault and battery and intentional infliction
of emotional distress); Huffman v. MQ Constr. Co., No. 08C3679, 2008 WL 4613903 (N.D.
IlI. Oct. 15, 2008) (sexual-harassment plaintiff sued employer under Title VII and brought
pendant state tort claims for battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress and retalia-
tory discharge).
110. See, e.g., McDonald's Corp. v. Ogbom, 309 S.W.3d 274 (Ky. App. 2009) (plaintiff's
common-law claims stood independently from and were not preempted or subsumed by
Kentucky's civil rights act).
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VII. THE TEXAS WHISTLEBLOWER ACT
The Texas Whistleblower Act (TWA) provides: "A state or local gov-
ernment entity may not suspend or terminate the employment of, or take
other adverse personnel action against, a public employee who in good
faith reports a violation of law by the employing governmental entity or
another public employee to an appropriate law enforcement author-
ity." ' In making a good-faith report of a violation of law, an employee
must believe he is "reporting conduct that constituted a violation of law
and his belief must have been reasonable based on his training and
experience. "112
City of Elsa v. Gonzalez interpreted and applied the TWA in a lawsuit
brought by a former city manager alleging he was unlawfully terminated
for reporting violations of law by the mayor and the city council to law
enforcement authorities. 113 Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that he re-
ported in good faith what he thought were illegal acts by Elsa's mayor as
well as other conduct by the city council allegedly violating the Texas
Open Meetings Act.114 The plaintiff successfully moved for summary
judgment and was awarded back pay and attorneys' fees by the trial
court, and the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals affirmed. 115
The city asked the Texas Supreme Court to rule that the courts had no
jurisdiction over the plaintiff's whistleblower claim because the plaintiff
made no allegation he engaged in protected conduct under and within the
meaning of the TWA.1 16 The supreme court agreed with the city and
reversed the court of appeals.11 7 The supreme court determined that
while the plaintiff pled he had reported "illegal acts" by the mayor to four
entities, 118 he did not specify what those acts were and never presented
any evidence that he believed constituted illegal activity by the mayor. 119
111. TEX. GoV'T CODE ANN. § 554.002(a) (West 2010); see also id. § 554.004(a) (estab-
lishing a rebuttable presumption that suspensions, terminations or other adverse employ-
ment actions occurring within 90 days of an employee's report occurred as a result of the
report); State v. Lueck, 290 S.W.3d 876, 878 (Tex. 2009) (waiving governmental immunity
for TWA violations).
112. City of Elsa v. Gonzalez, 325 S.W.3d 622, 626 (Tex. 2010) (per curiam); Tex. Dep't.
of Transp. v. Needham, 82 S.W.3d 314, 320 (Tex. 2002).
113. Gonzalez, 325 S.W.3d at 623.
114. Id.; see TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 551.141-142 (West 2010).
115. See City of Elsa v. Gonzalez, 292 S.W.3d 221, 223 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
2009, pet. granted), rev'd, 325 S.W.3d 622 (Tex. 2010).
116. Gonzalez, 325 S.W.3d at 624-25.
117. Id. at 624.
118. In an opinion letter the city attorney addressed conflicts of interest that could arise
if the mayor, Tony Barco, was appointed as assistant director of Hidalgo County Urban
County Program (HCUCP). The city attorney determined Barco had ipso facto resigned
as mayor when he assumed the HCUCP position and the city council subsequently voted
to accept Barco's implied resignation. The plaintiff delivered the city attorney's letter to
the Hidalgo County judge, the director of the HCUCP, the Hidalgo County district attor-
ney, and a local newspaper informing those entities that the city council had accepted the
mayor's resignation. See id. at 624-25.
119. See id. at 626-27.
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As for the plaintiff's claim that he informed the city council it was
meeting in violation of the Open Meetings Act, the supreme court deter-
mined the council was not an appropriate law enforcement authority
under the TWA and the plaintiff did not present any evidence of his good
faith belief that the Open Meetings Act authorized the city council to
regulate, enforce, prosecute, or investigate that body's alleged violation
of the law.120 Absent other evidence:
[Tihe fact that [the plaintiff] believed the city council had the au-
thority to postpone the meeting or otherwise prevent an alleged vio-
lation of the Open Meetings Act from occurring does not satisfy
either the objective or subjective components of a good-faith belief
that the city council was an appropriate law enforcement authority as
defined in section 554.002(b). 121
Accordingly, the supreme court reversed the court of appeals and dis-
missed the plaintiff's case. 122
VIII. CONCLUSION
The decisions discussed in the preceding pages resolved disputed legal
questions and provided guidance for employees pursuing and defending
against employment law claims and actions a23 Employees who contin-
ued to work for their employer after being promised a percentage of fu-
ture proceeds from a future sale or merger of the company had a
cognizable unilateral employment contract and breach-of-contract claim
when the company was sold and the promised payment was never made.
Employers prevailed in cases involving distinct areas of employment law:
120. Id. at 628.
121. Id.
122. Id.; see also Flores v. City of Liberty, 318 S.W.3d 551 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2010,
no pet.) (terminated police officer's report that another police officer committed animal
cruelty by killing a cat, even if the plaintiff only subjectively believed it was a legal viola-
tion, it was not a reasonable belief "for an officer with the [same] training, experience, and
responsibilities" as the plaintiff and the officer was not protected by the TWA).
123. Readers may also be interested in the following cases not discussed in the text:
Sullivan v. Leor Energy, LLC, 600 F.3d 542 (5th Cir. 2010) (an unsigned draft of an em-
ployment agreement did not take that agreement outside the Texas statute of frauds);
Johnson v. Diversicare Afton Oaks, LLC, 597 F.3d 673 (5th Cir. 2010) (plaintiff's claim of
retaliation for reporting legal violations under the Texas Health and Safety Code fails;
record evidence did not indicate that the plaintiff made a report within the meaning of the
statute); In re United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 307 S.W.3d 299 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding) (the
TCHRA's two-year statute of limitations for filing suit is mandatory but not jurisdictional);
Abatement Inc. v. Williams, 324 S.W.3d 858 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet.
filed) (employment contract was capable of enforcement within one year and therefore not
subject to the writing requirement of the statute of frauds); Physio GP, Inc. v. Naifeh, 306
S.W.3d 886 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (operators who were individ-
ual employees of a corporation could not be held personally liable for wrongful discharge
of an employee); Prairie View A&M Univ. v. Chatha, 317 S.W.3d 402 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. granted) (applying the federal Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009
to the Texas Commission of Human Rights, the court held that plaintiff's race and national
origin discrimination claims were timely filed); Tarrant Reg'l Water Dist. v. Villanueva, 331
S.W.3d 125 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2010, pet. filed) (declining to apply the federal Lilly
Ledbetter Act to plaintiff's state-law gender discrimination claim).
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the law governing arbitration of workplace disputes continues to hold
that parties to arbitration agreements must submit and have their cases
resolved in an arbitral and not a judicial forum; state sovereignty immu-
nity was recognized as a valid defense against a specific type of claim
arising under the FMLA; evidence of a worker's undocumented and un-
lawful immigrant status was held to be prejudicial and excluded in cir-
cumstances where such evidence was not relevant to the cause of action;
common-law negligence actions intertwined with statutory sexual harass-
ment claims were deemed preempted and subsumed by the TCHRA; and
a court did not have jurisdiction over the claim of a whistleblower plain-
tiff who failed to meet the TWA's reporting requirements. In sum, the
Survey period is one in which employers prevailed in litigation presenting
significant issues of employment law and policy.
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